Hiroshima Remembrance Address©

given by Ronald M. Katsuyama

at the Hiroshima Remembrance Candlelight Peace Vigil

Dayton, Ohio--August 6, 2004

E-Mail: rkatsuyama@voyager.net

      Tonight, we remember the lives lost in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945.  We must remember the horrible tragedy of these bombings because of the innocent civilians who were the victims of this military action.  We must remember these tragedies because we want to ensure that it will never happen again.

The first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on the morning of Aug. 6, 1945

Two family relatives, then 15 and 13 years old, living on the outskirts of Hiroshima, survived the bombing and told me of their experiences.  The older brother, due to an illness, was kept home from school that awful day.  When the bomb struck, many of his schoolmates were instantly cremated.  Piles of ashes were found arranged in rows where morning roll call had begun.  Fortunately, the younger brother was on a class visit to a factory outside the city, so he survived with minor burns.

Tragically, 200,000 other Hiroshima residents did not survive.  One-third died immediately from the explosion, while the remaining suffered a slow, agonizing death over the next 5 years.

      Residents of Nagasaki suffered from the second atomic bomb on August 9th.  Another 140,000 people died.  One-half perished immediately, and the other victims died over the next 5 years.

The decision to drop the bombs was made by our President at that time, Harry S. Truman, highly regarded by some for having taken a tough stance in fighting Communism, bringing on the Cold War, developing a reputation for thinking decisively, and portraying an attitude illustrated by a quote from an interview, “Never, never waste a minute on regret.”

Why were the atomic bombs used?

      The reason generally accepted by the public is that the atomic bombs immediately ended the war with Japan, thereby saving a half million American lives.

However, national leaders and close advisors of President Truman, including Generals Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, Curtis LeMay and George Marshall, and Admirals Chester Nimitz, William Halsey, Jr., and the President’s Chief of Staff, Admiral William Leahy, are all on record as saying the atomic bombs were not military necessities.

Further, U.S. intelligence knew of Japan’s attempts to engage Russia for help in brokering a surrender.  Emperor Hirohito and his top cabinet officials all favored surrender, as indicated by intercepted messages throughout July and early August.

The Potsdam Conference was held to coincide with the highly secret atomic bomb test at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16th.  It was at this conference that Stalin presented Japan’s offer of surrender to President Truman.  Under the proposed terms, Japan’s only non-negotiable condition was that they be allowed to retain their Emperor.  However, at the urging of Secretary of State, James Byrnes, Truman adhered to the proposition of “unconditional surrender,” under which Japan would be forced to renounce any allegiance to its Emperor.  Terms of “unconditional surrender,” without the qualification that Japan would need for acceptance, were incorporated into the Potsdam Declaration, contrary to the advice of Winston Churchill, Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and others.  In addition, omission of the Soviet Union as a signatory further diminished the possibility of its acceptance by Japan.

These developments at the Potsdam Conference cast the die for using the atomic bombs, if Truman’s most knowledgeable advisors were correct in believing that Japan would only surrender if its Emperor could be retained.  This condition and disclosure of the impending Soviet declaration of war against Japan were thought to be sufficient inducements for surrender.  However, instead of choosing a diplomatic solution, President Truman gave orders to drop the atomic bombs.

Russia’s expected Declaration of War against Japan followed Hiroshima on August 8th.  Japan publicly announced surrender on August 10th, and the U.S. accepted their conditions, which were virtually identical to those proposed by Japan two weeks earlier.

While the devastation caused by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima is assumed to have been the reason for Japan’s surrender, there is strong evidence, based upon intercepted war-time messages and post-war interviews, that Russia’s August 8th declaration of war against Japan had primary impact upon the thoughts of Japan’s cabinet and military leaders.

This evidence, consistent with the views of military leaders concerning Japan’s weakening capability for defense, provides compelling support for the view that use of the atomic bombs was unnecessary from a strictly military standpoint.

Use of atomic bombs was also unnecessary from a political standpoint.  For example, Truman’s diary entries reveal no concern about the public’s reaction to the specific terms of Japan’s eventual surrender.  Indeed, the New York Times’ headlines of August 12, 1945, read “GI’s in Pacific Go Wild With Joy; ‘Let ‘Em Keep Emperor,’ They Say.”

Why then, did Truman choose to use weapons of unparalleled mass destruction?  We can better understand his decision by examining certain prevailing conditions.

Conditions leading to Hiroshima and Nagasaki

First of all, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, led to an outrage and firm resolve to defeat Japan in war.  These feelings were represented by the rhetorical expression, “unconditional surrender.”

      Unfortunately, racial hatred led to the demonization of all Japanese, domestic as well as abroad.  In the hostile climate following Pearl Harbor, 120,000 residents of Japanese ancestry were incarcerated.  Two-thirds were U.S. citizens by virtue of their birth.  Internment was possible because Japanese American citizens and Japanese Nationals, alike, were vilified.  Because of a common heritage, both were held responsible for Pearl Harbor and, therefore, were considered justifiable targets for retribution.

Second, we now know from official declassified documents, letters, and memoirs that Truman’s major focus in his first few months of office leading to the Potsdam Conference in July was upon how to contain Soviet visions of expansion.

      Third, the concept of “all-out war,” one that includes widespread civilian casualties, was not new.  In fact, the fire-bombings of Berlin, Dresden, Tokyo, and other Japanese cities are estimated to have killed as many children, women, and civilian men as the atomic bombs.  (Consider the fact that Hiroshima was selected as a target for the initial atomic bomb because it was one of the few cities that remained relatively unscathed by prior bombs and, therefore, the effects of the atomic bomb could be clearly discerned.)

In sum, the use of atomic bombs on Japan was not solely about saving American lives or bringing an early end to the war with Japan.  Retribution against the Japanese for their attack on Pearl Harbor and their military’s horrific treatment of its prisoners and its inhumane treatment of civilians in China and Korea, an attempt to contain Soviet expansionist visions, and prior use of massive military force against civilians in hopes of undermining support for their military are all factors that must be considered.

How would history have changed had the U.S. offered Japan powerful inducements to surrender earlier in 1945?  Perhaps the loss of thousands of U.S. and Japanese troops during that summer, the Soviet invasion into China and its influence upon North Korea (the latter contributing to the Korean war), the rapid implementation of Soviet research into atomic weaponry and their deployment of such weapons in 1949, thereby starting an era of Cold War, all might have been avoided.

We should not dwell on past mistakes, engaging in endless debate over what “would have,” “could have,” and “should have been.”  But if history is to provide us with lessons for guidance through future conflicts, and if accumulated experiences are to lead to cultural wisdom, then we must reflect on our past.  We must seriously contemplate Hiroshima to extract lessons that can help ensure the survival of future generations.

Are there lessons to be learned from Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

      Truth was not revealed in events leading up to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  However, truth and honesty are necessary, both for our practice of democracy at home and for our moral leadership throughout the world.

      History is repeating itself.  We are again confronted with the harsh realization that our leaders are not being forthright and honest with us.  And, again, we have shunned diplomacy for military action.  Let us be wary of allowing tough rhetoric, unreasonable ultimatums, and pre-emptive war to achieve vague or narrow goals.  We should not, and cannot, remain silent when such aggression, terror, and destruction is orchestrated in our name, by just a few.  We must recognize the mistakes of Hiroshima, of Vietnam, and of Iraq, or we will, likely, repeat them elsewhere.

We hear proclamations by our national leaders that others must either be “with us or against us,” either “on the side of good or the side of evil,” and, not surprisingly, such rhetoric is accompanied by reminders of the greatness of our nation.  In stirring patriotic pride, we must also remember that the greatness of our nation lies in its belief in and practice of democratic principles.  Accordingly, we cannot always bully our competitors, antagonists, or enemies into submission without creating an endless spiral of aggression and violence.  Let us not accept the illusion that constant vigilance combined with overwhelming military strength implies freedom from terrorist acts against us.

Tonight, as we reflect upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, let us share thoughts and feelings that represent a new vision for our future.  Let us embrace our highest democratic ideals.  Let us embrace a future in which we condemn death and destruction brought to bear upon the vulnerable within our global community no matter how powerful the perpetrators.  And let us embrace the fundamental “golden” principle of justice common to all great religions and all great moral leaders, for we cannot secure for our children a future of peaceful co-existence with all peoples of the world unless we recognize that a spiral of violence implies the most horrible, and ultimately inevitable, consequences.

Let us, therefore, demand that our leaders pursue every opportunity for peaceful resolutions of conflicts.  Let us repudiate the strategies that would impose our will by massive military force and fear at the expense of diplomacy based upon mutual respect and moral leadership.  Let us insist upon policies that serve common interests, ones that seek to extend political, economic, and social justice to all people.  Let us choose the paths that lead toward a more inclusive, just, and lasting global peace.

©Copyright 2004, Ronald M. Katsuyama

*Note:  Interested readers can find more information in a comprehensive history by Gar Alperovitz.  His book, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (1995), also contains an excellent overview in his concluding chapter, "The Complicity of Silence."  Ronald Takaki's book, Hiroshima:  Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb (1995), provides a concise narrative of events, and it raises questions about whether our nation's history of racism and Truman's personal insecurities influenced his decision to drop the atomic bombs.

For a critique of the invasion of Iraq, see "Is Our President Out of Touch With Reality?":

http://www.publicscrutiny.net/2004/061204-katsuyama-Bush%20Reality.html